1749
Freedom makes man a moral subject. When he acts deliberately, man is, so to
speak, the father of his acts. Human acts, that is, acts that are freely chosen
in consequence of a judgment of conscience, can be morally evaluated. They are
either good or evil.
I.
The Sources of Morality
1750
The morality of human acts depends on:
-
the object chosen;
-
the end in view or the intention;
-
the circumstances of the action.
The
object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the "sources,"
or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.
1751
The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself.
It is the matter of a human act. the object chosen morally specifies the act of
the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in
conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational
order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
1752
In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because
it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, the intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. the end
is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the
action. the intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned
with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action
undertaken. The intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can
guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one's
whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of
helping one's neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as
the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be
inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain
a favor or to boast about it.
1753
A good intention (for example, that of helping one's neighbor) does not make
behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or
just. the end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent
person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the
other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that,
in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39 (Cf. ⇒ Mt 6:24. )
1754
The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a
moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or
evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish
or increase the agent's responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death).
Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves;
they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.
II.
Good Acts and Evil Acts
1755
A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the
circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is
good in itself (such as praying and fasting "in order to be seen by
men").
The
object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are
some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.
1756
It is, therefore, an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering
only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social
pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts
which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are
always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and
perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from
it.
IN
BRIEF
1757
The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three
"sources" of the morality of human acts.
1758
The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason
recognizes and judges it good or evil.
1759
"An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention"
(cf St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). the end does not justify the means.
1760
A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its
circumstances together.
1761
There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice
entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that
good may result from it.
GO TO:
SECTION ONE MAN'S VOCATION IN THE SPIRIT
CHAPTER ONE THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON
PART THREE LIFE IN CHRIST
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
PART ONE: THE PROFESSION OF FAITH
PART TWO: THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHRISTIAN MYSTERY
PART THREE: LIFE IN CHRIST
PART FOUR: CHRISTIAN PRAYER
Copyright © 2020 by Ekklesia Katholos (Acts 9:31)
SECTION ONE MAN'S VOCATION IN THE SPIRIT
CHAPTER ONE THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON
PART THREE LIFE IN CHRIST
PART ONE: THE PROFESSION OF FAITH
PART TWO: THE CELEBRATION OF THE CHRISTIAN MYSTERY
PART THREE: LIFE IN CHRIST
PART FOUR: CHRISTIAN PRAYER
Copyright © 2020 by Ekklesia Katholos (Acts 9:31)
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission from the publisher.
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